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The central  hypothesis  of  this  paper  is that  there may  be  situations  in  which  the  traditional 
approach to institutional analysis is of limited applicability. Such an approach, which has been called 
‘comparative institutional analysis’, consists of comparing institutional environments and institutional 
arrangements in terms of specific economic or other efficiency criteria to see which one performs 
better. However, because of limitations to accurately predict the future performance of alternative 
institutional  settings,  comparisons  are  not  always  possible.  Furthermore,  in  most  cases  the  only 
information  available  is  the  performance  of  the  current  institutional  setting.  To  account  for  this 
methodological deficiency, a generic methodology for institutional analysis, which consists of four 
steps (institutional structure, institutional efficiency, institutional choice, and institutional change), is 
proposed in this paper. Accordingly, the emphasis switches from evaluating alternative institutional 
choices to improving current scenarios. To show the validity of this methodology, some results of its 
application to a case study are presented. Although more research on this four-step methodology is 
needed, it proved to be robust when applied to the analysis of the governance of irrigated agriculture in 
the Peninsula of Santa Elena, Ecuador. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
According to Coase (2000) institutions are the key to explain economic performance. Therefore, it 
can  be  argued  that  the  institutions  of  a  country  (such  as  its  legal,  political,  and  social  systems) 
determine its economic performance. It is this that gives NIE its importance for economists, political 
scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about 
this important subject. Given that institutions provide the basic structure by which human beings 
throughout history have created a framework to reduce uncertainty in exchange, it is clear that they 
determine transaction and transformation costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging 
in economic activity. This implies that institutions are designed to achieve efficient outcomes, which 
means that they cannot be ignored in economic analysis because they play a key role in economic 
performance. 
This paper tackles an important methodological aspect of NIE, related to situations in which the 
traditional approach of NIE (comparative institutional analysis), may be of limited applicability (see 
Herrera,  2005).  Since  performance  is  a  derivative  of  the  institutional  choice  (see  Schmid,  2004) 
application of such an approach may not be feasible in some situations. This is true especially when 
the  only  available  information  is  the  performance  of  the  current  institutional  setting.  Actually, 
according to Schmid (2004) contrasting the performance of an institutional setting currently in place 
with another desired structure, says nothing about how to put the alternative in place. To account for 
this  deficiency,  a  generic  methodology  for  institutional  analysis,  which  consists  of  four  steps,  is 
proposed in this paper. A crucial feature of this methodology is that it requires viewing institutions 
from a game-theoretic perspective as opposed to the traditional rules-based view of institutions. To 
show the validity of this methodology, some findings of its application to a case study are shown. 
This  paper  consists  of  seven  sections.  After  this  introduction,  section  2  briefly  explains  the 
definition  of  institutions  stemming  from  the  game-theoretic  approach.  Section  3  discusses  the 
limitations  of  the  traditional  approach  of  institutional  analysis  and  provides  some  theoretical 
background  to  the  design  of  the  four-step  methodology.  Section  4  describes  the  proposed 
methodology. Section 5 links the institutions as equilibria approach with the methodological proposal. 
Section 6 presents some of the results obtained from the applications of such a methodology to the 
assessment  of  governance  of  irrigated  agriculture  in  Peninsula  of  Santa  Elena,  Ecuador.  Finally, 
section 7 presents conclusions of this research.  
2.  Defining institutions: a game-theoretic-based approach 
 
A well-accepted definition of institutions says that they are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more  formally,  that  they  are  humanly  devised  constraints  that  shape  human  interaction.  As  a 
consequence,  they  structure  incentives  in  human  exchange  whether  political,  social,  or  economic 
(North,  1990).  However,  this  rules-based  view  of  institutions  may  be  challenged  from  a  game-
theoretic  perspective,  as  such  a  view  implies  that  choice-sets  and  payoffs  are  constrained  by  the 
institutional setting. In this context players are unable to change the institutional setting while the 
game is played (Mittenzwei and Bullock, 2004).  
In contrast, the definition of institutions stemming from the game theoretic approach, which we 
share in this paper, is that of ‘institutions as equilibria’. Under this view, institutions in an equilibrium 
situation are established as a result of repeatedly played games. Players can then shape institutions 
through their strategic interaction. The primary difference between these two concepts of institutions is 
the  causal  connection  between  both,  constraints  and  interactions.  According  to  Mittenzwei  and 
Bullock (2004), advocates of the institutions-as-equilibria view study how equilibrium behavior leads 
to the establishment of human-made-constraints, while proponents of the institutions-as-rules view 
seem to focus on the impact of human-made-constraints on the (equilibrium) behavior of individuals. 
The  implications  of  conforming  to  this  definition  of  institutions  on  the  design  of  the  four-step 
methodology, is analyzed later.  
 
3.  Limitations of the traditional approach for institutional analysis 
 
Regarding  methodologies for undertaking institutional analysis, the vast majority of empirical 
studies come from the research program on transaction costs developed by Williamson (1975, 1979, 
1985, 1996), which is well-reviewed elsewhere
1. In this research tradition, transaction costs provide 
the key for understanding alternative forms of economic organization and contractual arrangements. 
What is important here is the cost of conducting transactions in one organizational or contractual form 
relative to the others. Therefore, what matters is not the absolute amount of transaction costs, but the 
relative ranking of transaction costs associated with different organizational or contractual choices.  
In trying to follow this tradition, however, it was soon evident that there has been little work 
undertaken  and  progress  made  in  applying  the  theoretical  developments  to  ex-ante  analysis  of 
proposals for institutional change. This is exemplified in the work of Ostrom (1990) where prediction 
of success or failure in common-property arrangements for the use of natural resources was hindered 
by the lack of appropriate theory for incorporating TC into the analysis of particular institutional 
structures,  and  in  determining  prospects  for  institutional  change
2.  This  implies  that  empirical 
comparative analysis of two or more institutional settings is not always possible, unless information on 
how each institutional setting performs is available. 
  According to Challen (2000) the root of this problem was to think of alternative institutional 
settings as mutually excludable. That is, as if there were only one feasible institutional setting, thus 
excluding the possibility of the existence of a whole range of institutional structures all acting at 
different  levels  in  the  allocation  of  a  particular  resource.  The  key  for  this  author  is  to  think  on 
institutional hierarchies were multiple regimes of property rights and their associated institutions can 
be  organized  simultaneously.  Under  this  view  the  emphasis  of  institutional  analysis  shifts  from 
assessing the benefits of particular property rights regimes or allocation mechanisms in isolation, to 
assessing  at  which  level  of  an  institutional  hierarchy  allocation  decisions  can  best  be  made. 
Furthermore,  by  including  the  institutions  as  equilibria  approach  to  the  analysis  of  economic 
institutions, the emphasis switches from analyzing proposals for alternative institutional settings to 
improving current scenarios. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See for example Joskow (1991); Shelanski and Klein (1995); Crocker and Masten (1996); Masten and Saussier (2000); 
Boerner and Macher (2001); Vannoni (2002). 
2 See Challen (2000) for more details.  4.  A generic four-step methodology for institutional analysis 
 
To account for this methodological deficiency, a generic methodology for institutional analysis, 
which consists of four steps, is proposed in this paper. By generic we mean a method that defines 
stages of research instead of specific approaches for designing institutional arrangements. 
The first step consists of understanding the institutional structure underlying the allocation of a 
particular resource, that is, the institutional parameters under which allocation decisions are made. The 
objective is to have a deep idea of the structure, actors, rules (formal or informal), that conform a 
specific economic system. In Schmid’s (2004) words, it consists of describing “the situation”. Thus, in 
order for analysts and researchers to propose improvements to the institutional structure, a first task 
should be to understand, through a detailed description, the functioning of the social network through 
which individuals coordinate their economic activities. To perform such a description we propose to 
consider the description of institutions by levels of Williamson (1996), which correspond to the left 
part  of  the  scheme  presented  in  figure  1.  Actually  our  proposal  of  a  four-step  methodology  for 
institutional analysis consists of adding these four steps as an analytical dimension to the three-level-






















Figure 1: A conceptual model for institutional analysis. Source: based on Williamson (1996) and the author. 
 
Accordingly,  the  object  of  analysis  of  the  four-step  methodology  is  governance,  which  is 
bracketed  by  more  macrofeatures  (the  institutional  environment)  and  more  microfeatures  (the 
individual  actions).  Moreover,  description  of  governance  should  include  primary  and  secondary 
effects. Primary effects are shown by the solid arrows and secondary effects by dashed arrows. Thus, 
the solid arrow from the individual to governance carries the behavioral assumptions within which the 
governance structure operates. The arrow from the institutional environment to governance illustrates 
the way formal rules at the constitutional level fix governance parameters. Feedbacks effects from 
governance to the institutional environment can be either instrumental or strategic
3. Feedback from 
governance to the level of the individual can be interpreted as ‘endogenous preferences’ formation, 
due to advertising or other forms of education. The individual is also influenced by the institutional 
environment in that endogenous preferences are the product of social conditioning. 
                                                 
3 An example of instrumental feedback would be an improvement in contract law, brought about at the request of parties who 
find that extant law is poorly suited to support the integrity of a contract. An example of strategic feedback could be when 



















Authors’ four-step methodology for 
institutional analysis The  second  step  of  our  methodology  consists  of  assessing  the  efficiency  of  the  institutional 
structure. The concept of efficiency used in this paper is that of NIE, which relates efficiency to 
performance. Given the impossibility of testing which institutional alternative performs better, since 
performance is a derivative of the institutional choice (see Schmid, 2004), our proposal consists of 
assessing the current institutional structure to see whether this is producing socially and economically 
desirable outcomes. If not, this would suggest the need to depict a new institutional setting. Note that 
in  this  stage,  the  institutional  structure  is  taken  as  given.  The  key  question  is  how  the  different 
institutions  involved  (formal  and  informal)  would  affect  the  observed  outcome  in  the  context  of 
different interests of different people. According to this, the efficiency of a specific institutional setting 
is the result of a mixture of institutions and a given institutional structure, which is supposed to reflect 
an equilibrium state (equilibrium behavior). Our approach to institutional efficiency departs from the 
identification of efficiency criteria, which would allow us to qualify the competence of the prevailing 
institutional setting. 
The third step is institutional choice or the process of designing institutional arrangements. In our 
methodology the focus is on looking for arrangements that could contribute to improve the current 
performance of the institutional structure, which previously has been regarded to be a problem. In our 
view,  arrangements  are  institutional  alternatives  that  people  can  depict  and  choose  to  order  their 
interdependencies. This implies that the actual choice of arrangements may have an impact over the 
institutional environment or the individual (or both). In this respect, Schmid (2004) suggests that 
theory  can  be  used  to  produce  knowledge  to  better  inform  people  of  the  choice  of  institutional 
arrangements so that different people with different interests can work to achieve the institution that 
provides the performance they want. Our approach to institutional choice implies the design of a set of 
arrangements  which  should  procure  the  interaction  of  individuals,  either  for  improving  the 
performance  of  the  day-to-day  use  of  the  resource,  or  to  build  a  more  feasible  institutional 
environment. 
  The fourth and last step is institutional change. This is defined as the process of moving from a 
socially and economically undesirable institutional equilibrium towards a new one. This implies that 
social and economic objectives for the allocation of resources are well defined, in addition to having 
available information about the potential of the proposed institutional arrangements to move to such 
new institutional equilibrium. The purpose of this last step is not to predict the future, but to inform 
people of the choice of a particular institutional setting and how they could use existing political 
institutions to implement such changes.  
Note  that  describing  the  structure,  determining  the  efficiency  (performance),  identifying 
institutional  choices  or  arrangements  and  analyzing  ways  of  conducting  the  implied  process  of 
institutional  choice,  is  a  dynamic  process  which  involves  institutions  (formal  and  informal)  that 
determine the functioning of the governance structure. Therefore, the optimality of an equilibrium 
state is being analyzed. 
One last aspect to consider has to do with the limitations of the traditional TC-based approach for 
institutional choice, as this ignores the fact that processes of institutional change may be limited by 
institutional choice. The reasoning is that when processes of change are included in the problem of 
institutional choice, it  can  be  the case  that limitations  for  undertaking  such  changes  may  impose 
substantial constraints on that choice. That is, institutional choice and institutional change need to be 
jointly considered.  
From  an  extensive  literature  review  (see  Herrera,  2005),  it  was  possible  to  identify  that 
researchers working on NIE consciously or unconsciously were working on each of the steps proposed 
here  as  the  four-step  methodology  for  institutional  analysis,  although  separately.  In  this  respect, 
perhaps the closest attempt to construct a practical framework for analyzing institutions is the work of 
Challen  (2000),  although  his  emphasis  was  on  property  rights  as  institutions.  Our  contribution 
basically consists of both, proposing, and testing a research methodology to undertake institutional 
analysis of resource allocation structures.  
 
5. The dynamics of institutional analysis 
 
Two  questions  are crucial  in this  discussion  as  the  scheme  presented in figure  1 suggests  a 
cycled-dynamic of institutional analysis with no end, but more importantly with no beginning. These questions are: starting from what state of affairs should we begin the analysis of the performance of 
institutions? and why should we do this? The answer to the second question is naive: simply because 
there  are  symptoms  of  bad  performance  and  actions  are  required,  otherwise  sustainability  of  the 
institutional structure would be endangered. The answer to the first question, however, is less intuitive. 
To answer this, we need to bring into the discussion the notion of institutions-as-equilibria discussed 
previously (see section 2, defining institutions). According to this view, a particular setting of formal 
and informal institutions is established as a result of a repeatedly played game. This implies that 
human-made constraints are established as a result of an equilibrium behavior. Therefore, describing 
the institutional structure and its efficiency indeed implies that the optimality of an equilibrium state is 














Figure 2: Dynamic of institutional adjustments. 
 
Accordingly, the starting point is the recognition of institutions as behavioral equilibria. Actually, 
a description of the current institutional structure implies that equilibrium state A is being described. 
Thus, in case the observed outcome of an institutional equilibrium does not correspond to what society 
in  some  instance  has  defined  as  the  desired  outcome,  a  process  of  institutional  change  may  be 
required, so that a new equilibrium state B may be depicted. Such a process would imply seeking for 
institutional  arrangements  which  in  principle  should  lead  society  to  this  new  more  desirable 
equilibrium. The key is to understand the mechanisms by which both formal and informal institutions 
can be adjusted to reach such a new equilibrium. Note that one element of figure 2 has been absent in 
the discussion so far. This is the notion of a society defining goals for allocating resources, which we 
think should be the fundamental driving factor of an institutional change process. Indeed, when social 
planning has not been well-defined, specific institutional arrangements should also be provided to 
overcome this void.  
Another important aspect to consider in the discussion of the feasibility of this methodological 
proposal is the notion of path dependence and locked institutions, which corresponds to the traditional 
view of institutional change of North (1990). Accordingly, institutions are the result of historical 
processes,  which  explain  why  inefficient  structure  prevails  inevitably  for  a  long  time,  thereby 
hindering growth. According to Eggertsson (2004b), however, institutions can be unlocked from the 
pernicious political realities of the past. This is possible as incomplete knowledge and exogenous 
shocks  sometimes  create  opportunities  for  reform  (Eggertsson,  2004a).  Thus,  when  unexpected 
external impulses or endogenous development destabilize the social equilibrium, pivotal actors often 
become uncertain about prevailing social models and show readiness to experiment with new social 
technologies. 
 
6. Application of the four-step methodology to the analysis of irrigated agriculture: the case of 
Peninsula of Santa Elena, Ecuador 
 
To  test  the  validity  of  the  four-step  methodology  for  institutional  analysis,  a  case  study  was 
selected. This is related to the provision of irrigation in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE), Ecuador. 
In this area, the government carried out the construction of one of the biggest and more expensive 



















goals results are rather mediocre. The core problem in the PSE is the underutilization of land and water 
resources, which has direct implications on the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of the canals, 
which are starting to deteriorate. In this section we report some of the findings of a research program 
that was developed to provide solutions to the problem mentioned. 
 
6.1 Some important features of the case study 
 
The PSE is a coastal area of about 6,050 km2 (605,000 ha). Until the end of the 19th century, it 
was considered an area with high potential for developing agricultural activities (ESPOL et al. 2001). 
Nevertheless, due to an abrupt deforestation that altered the hydrological cycle, such good conditions 
changed. According to Da Ros (1994) only 1 percent of the original forest of the PSE survived, which 
in turn converted this area in one of the driest areas of Ecuador (Larrea and Varea, 1997). The solution 
offered  by  the  government  was  the  construction  of  the  Aqueduct  Santa  Elena  Hydraulic  Project 
(PHASE), which according to CEDEGE (2001) is the largest and most modern irrigation project in 
Ecuador.  Nonetheless,  so  far  the  performance  of  the  system  is  rather  mediocre.  In  8  years  of 
functioning, the system has not shown the expected benefits with only about 20 percent of its capacity 
in use. Furthermore, recovery of the investment is zero as neither operation nor maintenance costs are 
covered and still remain highly subsidized (Herrera et al. 2004). 
The governmental agency in charge of infrastructure development was the Commission for the 
Development of the Guayas River Basin (CEDEGE). The different stages of the project began in 1986 
and consisted of about 120 kilometers of canals, a tunnel of seven kilometers, two pumping stations to 
elevate water 70 meters, and three dams with a total storage capacity of 352 million cubic meters. The 
irrigation  capacity  was  calculated  to  be  42,000  hectares  (from  which  around  40  percent  is  still 
unfinished) with an investment of about US$ 550 million, mostly granted by international development 
organizations by way of external debt or contributions.  
The conflicts in PSE started when CEDEGE announced the construction of the irrigation system, 
which sparked a sudden interest for buying land under the influence of the canals. Not only farmers but 
particularly speculators took advantage of both the misinformation on the value of those lands and the 
confusing legal framework regarding the property of land by the communes. The final outcome is that 
according to non-officials figures from CEDEGE, during the last 2 years (2003-2004) less than 5,000 
ha have been cultivated.  
There is no accurate information about land tenure under the influence of the irrigation system, 
although it is estimated that about 90 percent has been sold to non-native individuals, including land 
speculators attracted by the apparent potential to develop irrigated agriculture. Such attraction can be 
in part explained by the enormous governmental investment per hectare of about US$ 13,000. This 
value  results  from  dividing  total  investment  in  the  irrigation  system  (USD  550  million)  by  the 
projected irrigation capacity (42,000 ha), which has mainly benefited new landholders who, according 
to  table  1,  do  not  number  more  than  300  people.  This  figure  comes  from  extracting  from  total 
landowners (472), those that have farm plots in the size range of 0 to 5 ha, in which mostly commoners 
are grouped. Table 1 also shows for different ranges of farm sizes, the corresponding number of water 
users and the quantity of hectares held by each group. It may be observed that 10 percent of total water 














Table 1: Registered irrigators in the PSE and hectares per group category 
Ranges of farm size 
(ha)  Landowners  %  Hectares  % 
0 - 5  169  36  373  1 
 5 - 10  59  13  454  1 
10 - 20  34  7  539  1 
20 - 50  76  16  2,609  6 
50 - 100  50  11  4,007  10 
100 - 200  39  8  5,986  15 
> 200  45  10  26,662  66 
TOTAL  472  100%  40,630  100% 
Source: survey data gathered by ESPOL et al. 2001 It is important to mention that irrigation water in the PSE is charged volumetrically and that there 
is no obligation of use. The price is USD 0.03 per cubic meter in open-canals areas and USD 0.04 in 
pressurized irrigation areas, although it is well-known that such prices are not calculated on a technical 
basis.  The  predominant  irrigation  technologies  are  drip  and  microsprinkler  with  about  3,000  ha 
together. In turn, the predominant crops are mangoes (2,200 ha approx.), cocoa (730 ha approx.), corn 
(870 ha approx.) and some citric.  
Regarding the communes of the PSE (65 in total spread in 220 towns, PIGSA, 2002), their main 
characteristic is their communal organization whose predominant feature is the communal ownership 
of land. They are still considered the largest population group and possessed approximately 85 percent 
of the land before the construction of the irrigation system. However, after the process of transfer of 
property of land, they have been pushed to unproductive lands without possibilities for development. 
Therefore, even though water availability was considered the key limiting factor for the development 
of the PSE, now it is a resource available only to those who can pay its price in terms of CEDEGE’s 
current policy (Herrera et al. 2004). In either way, asymmetry of information regarding the potential of 
the PHASE always prevailed in favor of land buyers. 
Before the construction of the PHASE, peasant-commoner’s agriculture was possible through the 
exploitation of the ‘albarradas’. These are small dams  with natural walls built between two hills, 
generally over the dry bed of a river. Its design is circle-shaped. The accumulation of water is possible 
through both a slow process of accumulation of rain water and from ephemeral rivers.  
One important point to mention here is that albarradas is a very cheap technology. They offer 
several social and environmental-positive impacts, which were not considered at the design stage of 
the PHASE. In fact, according to Alvarez (1995) “CEDEGE designed a specific model of development 
to promote extensive cropping […] ignoring the traditional system of complementarity and diversified 
exploitation, that even in small scale, still works in communal lands”. However, given that commoners 
cannot easily afford investments in agricultural technology, their main strategy has been either to 
continue doing economic exchange limited by the institutional structure in place or to sale the land. 
This may explain why at some point massive sales of communal lands took place in the PSE as short 
term benefits from selling may have been higher than long term uncertain benefits from the provision 
of  irrigation  through  the  PHASE.  This  is  particularly  true  if  we  consider  that  the  PHASE  was 
constructed under a very particular model of development irrelevant to the communal organizations.  
 
6.2 Step 1: description of the governance structure 
 
The  more  distinctive  aspect  of  the  agricultural  system  in  the  PSE  is  the  low  organization  of 
farmers for key issues like management of the irrigation system. In fact, it has not been possible to 
complete  the  transfer  of  irrigation  management  (TIM)  responsibilities  to  water  users  associations 
(WUAs) in the PSE, among other reasons because of the low performance of agriculture, which has 
been appointed to be due to incipient farmer’s backward-linkages with input supply systems (financing 
included), as well as to poor forward-linkages with output marketing systems. 
Since the PHASE started its operation, irrigation allocation follows an administrative-bureaucratic 
process run by CEDEGE. This process includes individual registration of irrigators and establishment 
of a price-fixing agreement. The structure of governance in this case is somewhere between a very thin 
market  because  of  the  price  mechanism,  but  in  particular  because  of  the  asset-specificity  put  by 
CEDEGE in the PHASE. Regarding land allocation, this is done through market mechanisms although 
limited by the communes’ legal framework, which as said before, is subtly interpreted to allow the 
transfer  of  rights.  The  critical  point  here  is  the  rejection  by  CEDEGE  of  the  impact  of  the 
concentration  of  property  of  land  in  few  hands  as  a  key  factor  determining  the  performance  of 
agriculture in the PSE. 
Table 2 summarizes the institutional structure of allocation of water and land resources in PSE. 
This  table  follows  the  three-level  scheme  of  institutions  of  Williamson  (1996).  For  each  level 
(Institutional Environment, Governance, Individual), the enforcement, the transaction costs, and the 
perceptions  among  private  landholders  and  commoners  are  assessed  respectively.  As  it  can  be 
observed, in the institutional level water in Ecuador is defined as a public good, which in the practice 
is equated to state good. This definition conflicts with previous private water rights, which were not 
abolished. * Based on information gathered by the authors. 
 
The implication of this is that individual’ perceptions regarding irrigation water is that of a free 
public  good  while  perceptions  regarding  the  canals  is  that  of  a  state  good,  therefore  it  is  the 
government responsibility to operate and maintain them. The level of enforcement is medium to low 
because neither conflict resolution mechanisms nor organizations are well-defined in the water law. 
Regarding the canals, in the case of the PSE, they are considered a property of the State, as no transfer 
to users has been possible yet.  
 
6.3 Step 2: Institutional efficiency 
 
6.3.1 Property rights and efficiency of the institutional structure of property rights 
 
This  section  tackles  the  problem  of  poorly  defined  property  rights  and  the  effects  over  the 
performance of the system
4. It is argued that Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) can be applied to 
evaluate the degree of inefficiency of a prevailing institutional structure such as the one that is actually 
used in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE). Willingness to Pay (WTP) questions can indeed be used to 
value the outcome of a policy intended to assure the right to have an efficient management of the 
canals, which implies a more active participation of users in O&M activities. The procedure applied 
consisted  of  eliciting  among  farmers  an  economic  value.  The  evaluation  criterion  consists  of 
comparing the resulting economic value with the price currently charged to irrigators. Any deviation is 
considered an economic rent which is wasted. Thus, CVM is used to investigate the potential benefits 
of a hypothetical change in the existing property rights structure.  
The discussion point raised is therefore whether the economic value of a particular resource is 
influenced by the institutional structure of property rights involved in the allotment of such a resource. 
Based on economic principles the answer is ` yes' . However, in the application arena, few studies have 
related their aggregated monetary valuations with the institutional structure of property rights. This 
becomes particularly cumbersome when the resource has no close substitutes or when there are neither 
well-defined nor well-enforced property rights as is typically the case in countries such as Ecuador. 
Given that in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE) irrigation is already priced under a particular 
institutional structure, economic values can in this case be calculated and used to assess the efficiency 
of the institutional structure of property rights by means of comparing the estimated value against the 
current price of water. The hypothesis is that a sub-optimal definition of property rights limits the 
value people assign to water. People may in fact be willing to pay higher values for having better 
defined property rights that assure them a more active participation in the management of the canals 
                                                 
4 This section briefly summarizes the analysis of property rights and efficiency of the institutional structure. A complete 
version of this analysis is published in Herrera, et al. 2004. 
Table 2: Institutional structures of allocation of land and water resources in the PSE* 
  Definition  Level of enforcement 
Water  Public good – State Good (In conflict 
with previous rights)  Medium to low 
Canals  State good  High 
Institutional 
Environment: the 
rules of the game 
Land  Private good – Common good (In 
conflict / private vs. commoners)  Low 
  Structure  Transaction costs 
Water  Administrative – Bureaucratic  Relatively low 
Access to the 




Land  Market (very thin)  High 
  Private Farmers  Peasants-Commoners 
Water  Private property once acquired  Common property 
Canals  State property  State property 
Perceptions of 
Individuals  
Land  Private property  Common property and an optimal provision of irrigation
5. If this is the case it means that institutional failures in the PSE 
do not allow internalizing (through price) what users perceive irrigation should be valued at. 
The  strategy  followed  in  this  section  was  to  undertake  an  economic  valuation  exercise  that 
intentionally  implies  a  change  (through  the  wording  of  the  WTP  question)  in  the  property  rights 
structure of irrigation in the PSE. The proposed change involves the right of users to have a more 
active participation in O&M activities. Thus, given that irrigation water is priced, on average, at US$ 
0.035 per m3, the WTP-CV question is expected to yield a higher aggregated value. This higher value 
would demonstrate that marginal improvements in the structure of property rights are valued positively 
by irrigators in the PSE. This in turn implies that the underlying institutional structure is not efficient, 
given that it does not allow maximizing welfare because of the rents that are not being internalized and 
used to finance such improvements. Table 3 shows partly the results obtained. The single-bounded 
logit analysis uses as dependent variable the acceptance (` yes=1' ) or rejection (` no=0' ) to the first bid 
amount.  
 
Table 3: Single bounded WTP coefficients estimation 
Variables  Expected 
effect  Coefficients  Means of 
variables 
Constant  +  13.636  (2.369) **  -- 
Bid price (ELI1)  -  -205.381 (43.04)**  0.042 
Predominance of permanent crops (PERMCR)  + / -  -3.681  (0.377)**  1.60 
Proportion of use (PROPUSE)  +  7.485  (0.923)**  0.55 
Gross annual income (GAI)  +  -1.367  (0.225)**  1.09 
Log Likelihood: -11.863; LR Statistic (4df): 49.577; Probability of LR: 0.000 
Info Criterion (minimum values) Akaike: 0.56; Schwarz: 0.736637; Hannan-Q: 0.6303  
Percentage of correct classifications: 88.3%; Percent gain from default (constant probability) specification: 61.11% 
Nagelkerke R square = 0.797; McFadden R-squared = 0.676326 
Goodness of fit: H-L Statistic = 1.0343, prob (Chi-Sq-8df) = 0.9980; Andrews Statistic (grouped by ELI) = 0.0485, 
prob (Chi-Sq-3df): 0.9972 
* Significance: p< 0.05; ** significance: p<0.1; *** significance p<0,15 
 
Figure 3 shows some interactions in terms of the probability of accepting the bid against the price 















   
Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of accepting the price bid for different scenarios of land use and income. 
 
As  can  be  observed  from  figure  3, the  higher  the percentage  of  use of land,  the  higher  the 
probability of accepting an increased price bid is. Thus for example, while the probability that farmers 
who use about 20 percent of their land would accept a price bid of about two cents per cubic meter is 
almost 100 percent, farmers who use 100 percent of their land are fully willing to accept a price bid of 
about 5 cents per cubic meter.  
                                                 
5 As it was seen in the previous sections, users have almost no participation in the management of the irrigation system and 
most of the attributions are left to the government. For the logit probability model, Hanemann (1984) provides formulas to aggregate values of WTP 
based on the estimated coefficients. Applying these formulas it was possible to estimate an aggregated 
value of US$ 0.05 per cubic meter of irrigation water. As expected, the resulting aggregated value of 
WTP is higher than the current water price (US$0.035 per cubic metre in average), which means that 
the gain in efficiency due to the public provision of irrigation under the conditions of the hypothetical 
situation are wasted rents. This confirms the hypothesis of an inefficient institutional structure of water 
allocation for the specific case of the PSE. This introduces an important consideration for future CV 
studies. The  results  indicate that it  is  possible  to  apply  CVM  to  value  marginal WTP for  partial 
changes in the institutional structure of property rights of a specific resource. So, maximizing the 
value of a resource by introducing the correct incentives in an environment of well-defined property 
rights can be a more useful approach for CV than just calculating an aggregated monetary value. The 
challenge, therefore, is to find out what type of institutional structure (regime) of property rights 
maximizes the economic value people assign to a particular resource.  
A favorable point is that the hypothetical programme proposed is valued at US$0.015 per cubic 
metre  over  the  current  price  of  US$0.035,  which  means  that  the  programme  is  considered  an 
improvement and could be considered an objective for future policy design for this specific case. In 
terms of institutional efficiency, this analysis reveals that the current allocation of property rights does 
not perform well in defining the attributions and duties of the users and the sole provider, CEDEGE. 
Furthermore, given that the current structure does not allow a more active participation of users in the 
management of the irrigation system, WTP of farmers may be limited. Thus, it is possible to conclude 
that free government assistance through the PHASE has created a sense of speculative dependency 
among landholders towards the government for the irrigation system. Government investment has 
served to create the impression that the irrigation structures belong to the government and that it is the 
responsibility of the government to minimize the cost of irrigation to the farmers. Such assistance has 
certainly discouraged farmers from taking collective action to maintain the canals and certainly limits 
their WTP for irrigation water. The fact that property rights are so important for securing farmers 
involvement  implies  that  the  way  irrigation  management  devolution  programs  are  structured,  or 
organized, will determine to what extent farmers are willing to provide collective action for irrigation 
management. 
 
6.3.2 Asymmetric Information on the Provision of Irrigation through a Public Infrastructure 
 
As mentioned before, due to mismanagement of information and bad definition of goals by the 
government, a massive interest in acquiring communal lands started in the Peninsula of Santa Elena 
(PSE) after the government announced the construction plan of a large public irrigation system. During 
this process, information asymmetries regarding the potential of the irrigation system always prevailed 
in favor of land buyers. This section starts from the hypothesis that AI has an important impact over 
the observed pattern of land use and therefore irrigation in the PSE
6. Under the condition of AI for 
public goods with costly access, this section shows the results of a test conducted to determine which 
of the characteristics for an optimal allocation fits in the case of the PSE. Farmer’s marginal cost (MC) 
of access to irrigation in connection with the concentration of the property of land by new landholders 
is considered the relevant informational variable.  
Two characteristics that have been studied by Cremer & Laffont (2003) about this type of goods 
are that in some cases there is no obligation of use and access may be costly. This last feature is 
particularly important because it implies that some private goods must be jointly consumed with the 
public good to have access to the benefits of the provision of the public good. In this case, land is one 
of  the  private  economic  goods  that a  person  must  first  acquire to  have  access  to  the  benefits  of 
irrigation. Other costs are those of connecting to the canals through irrigation technologies and the 
costs  of  farming  itself.  This  assertion  implies  that  it  is  not  enough  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
availability of the public good (water in this case); it is also necessary to make sure that users can 
afford the costs of acquiring the rest of the associated private goods, including the costs of defending 
the property of land through communal organizations in the case of the peasants-commoners. 
                                                 
6This section briefly summarizes the analysis of asymmetric information and the use of land and water resources in the PSE. 
A complete version of this analysis is contained in Herrera 2005, chapter 7. The  empirical  strategy  consisted  of  testing  which  characteristics  for  an  optimal  utilitarian 
allocation of the public good (irrigation) with costly access and no obligation of use fit for the case of 
the  PSE.  The  objective  is  to  understand  how  under  certain  conditions  the  provision  and  use  of 
irrigation is affected, even when the resource is supposedly so valuable that it should be used by all. 
To do this, it was necessary to estimate a cost function based on significant cost driving variables, 
from which marginal cost of access to irrigation can be estimated. The following augmented log linear 
specification was first investigated for the relevant output variable which is expressed in irrigated 
hectares. 
 
log(Ki) = ￿0 + ￿1log(IRhai) + ￿2log(DISTi) + ￿3log(TOTAi) + ￿4TECHi + ￿5Wi + ￿6FAi + ￿7CWUi + 
￿8PERMi + ￿9NPERMi + ￿10CRAi + ￿11log(IRRAi)log(DISTi) +…+ ￿lilog(IRRAi)CRAi + ￿i 
 
where: Ki = average total cost per hectare of cropping including connection costs; IRha = irrigated 
area in hectares; DIST = distance to the source of water in kilometers; TOTA = total farm area in 
hectares; TECH = technical level of the farm being 1=low; 2=medium; 3=high; W = dummy variable 
being 1=commoner and 0=non-commoner; FA = number of available facilities as percentage of total 
facilities  (electricity,  phone,  etc);  CWU  =  percentage  of  CEDEGE’s  water  use  from  total  water 
requirement; PERM = ha with permanent crops as a percentage of total cropped area; NPERM = ha 
with non-permanent crops as a percentage of total cropped area; CRA = cultivated area as a percentage 


















According to the results of table 4, the elasticity with respect to irrigated hectares is 0.99 which 
implies that investment on irrigation technology is an important cost factor. Furthermore, it is possible 
to conclude that total costs as well as marginal costs increase significantly with (i) the number of 
available facilities, FA (phone, electricity, etc.); (ii) the proportion of water needs satisfied through 
CEDEGE’s canals which is linked to water charges, CWU; and (iii) the proportion of cultivated land, 
CRA. A significant influence can also be attributed to being or not being a peasant-commoner, W. 
Thus, average MC per hectare of accessing to the benefits of irrigation provision for the case of 
commoners is about US$ 145 while for non-commoners it is about US$ 2,890. This is obtained from 
calculating  the  antilog  of  the  resulting  marginal  cost  for  v  (the  new  landholders)  and  (1-v,  the 
commoners) in table 4.  
Using these results it was possible to conclude that Asymmetric Information has the following 
consequences
7. First, it allows a solution in which only the commoners consume the entire provision 
of  irrigation  available  to  them.  This  implies  that  concentration  of  lands in  the  hands  of  the  new 
landholders and the high marginal cost per hectare of farming on such lands induces a scenario in 
which landholders demand a smaller quantity of irrigation. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the use 
                                                 
7 A detailed explanation of the model of asymmetric information and how the empirical results led us to determine which of 
the characteristics for an optimal allocation fits in the case of the PSE, can be found in Herrera, 2005. 
Table 7.2: Estimation Results 
Variables  Coefficient (t-value) 
Constant  5.01 (7.80)* 
Log(IRha)  0.99 (2.62)* 
W  -0.87 (-4.30)* 
FA  0.96 (1.90)** 
CWU  1.55 (2.31)* 
PERM  -0.01 (-2.87)* 
NPERM  -0.45 (-2.07)* 
CRA  -0.77 (-2.53)* 
Log(IRha)TOTA  -0.09 (-2.93)* 
Log(IRha)CWU  -0.37 (-1.15) 
R2 (adjusted)  0.65 
Akaike  2.66 
Standard error  0.872 
Marginal Costs (MC)  5.09 (5.32) 
MC for v  4.98 (4.79) 
MC for 1-v  8.01 (6.02) 
* Significance at 5%; ** significance at 10% of land and water resources in the PSE is economically inefficient. This result is crucial as this would 
demonstrate that commoners are more efficient users of the irrigation system, although at very low 
scale. Nonetheless, we think that the observed pattern of land property in the PSE cannot be reversed.  
This implies that a new institutional setting will have to consider the participation of these two 
heterogeneous groups (private landholders and commoners), and find ways to take advantage of the 
capabilities of each group. According to Cremer and Laffont (2003), in this scenario although the 
provision  of  irrigation  is the  same  as  with  full information,  however  in  order  to  account  for  the 
information rent gained by the new landholders, the demand for irrigation of this group is reduced. In 
terms of equity, it is possible to conclude that while the availability of irrigation can be considered an 
apparent Pareto improvement for all, it benefits the new landholders than the commoners. Therefore, 
the observed outcome is also socially inefficient. 
 
6.4 Steps 3 and 4: Institutional choice and institutional change 
 
The objective of this section is to derive some elements with respect to the final choice of an 
institutional setting (institutional arrangements) and a path of institutional change for the PSE. To do 
this, the theoretical framework of institutional choice and institutional change is revisited. The aim is 
to understand the dynamics of the forces that could produce changes in the institutional structure. 
According to the approach of institutions as equilibria that we share in this dissertation, a key aspect to 
have  in  mind  is  that  the  implementation  of  institutional  arrangements,  if  correctly  designed  and 
applied, should in principle enable society to reach a new desired institutional equilibrium, for which a 
process of institutional change needs to be drawn.  
According  to  North  (1990),  there  are  two  principal  deficiencies  in  traditional  models  of 
institutional change. Firstly, they fail to explain empirical evidences of the persistence of nonefficient 
institutional structures and the introduction of inefficient institutions; and secondly, the models do not 
specifically recognize the roles of the actors that produce change. According to him, changes may 
arise from private economic agents (firms, consumers, associations) which can modify both informal 
and formal institutions (although the latter not directly), and political organizations, which directly 
modify formal institutions. An interpretation of North’s model of institutional change was schematized 
by Challen (2000). This is shown in figure 4 although with some  modifications to allow for the 




















  Figure 4: Conceptual model of the Process of Institutional Change. Based on Challen (2000) 
 
From the perspective that institutional change arises from the actions of individuals, there are two 
generic types of individuals within the model: the private stakeholders and the political stakeholders. 
Private stakeholders can be firms, households, producers and even consumers that comprise the typical 
 set  of  actors  in  traditional  economic  models.  Political  stakeholders  on  the  other  hand  comprise 
members  of  the  polities  that  develop  and  implement  formal  institutions  for  social  or  economic 
exchange. According to the original model, the process of institutional change is a continuous one. 
However, it is clear that there must be a starting point, which according to our view consists of the 
institutional setting in place and the underlying institutional equilibrium. Thus, the institutional setting 
comprises a component of both, the economic environment of private stakeholders and the political 
environment of political stakeholders. These environments present the respective stakeholders with 
benefits and costs of prospective actions which include options for maintaining the status quo, as well 
as for altering the existing institutions. 
According to this model, private stakeholders maximize an intertemporal utility function, for 
which  they  take  into  account  the  existing  institutional  environment,  the  availability  of  ‘scarce’ 
resources, their tastes and preferences, and a given state of production technology. These components 
combine to determine prices and to create perceptions of costs and benefits to the private stakeholder 
for all possible actions. The same occurs with the political stakeholders, except that they maximizes 
some  other  form  of  utility  function,  and  combines  social  technology  (instead  of  a  production 
technology) and their political tastes and preferences in order to form their perceptions of costs and 
benefits for all possible actions. Note that if both, political and private stakeholders perceive that their 
respective costs of actions are higher than their respective benefits, no actions (no institutional change) 
can be foreseen to occur, which in turn implies the path of institutional development is locked in a 
unfavorable environment of underdevelopment . 
The  question  now  is:  given  the  institutional  equilibrium  in  the  PSE,  which  is  mainly 
characterized by a low performance of irrigated agriculture, what kind of institutional arrangements 
(institutional choices) should be provided in order to activate a process of institutional change to allow 
society to reach a new and more efficient institutional equilibrium. Following the logic of the four-step 
methodology for institutional analysis, this implies that we need to know perfectly where we are 
(institutional structure in equilibrium) and where we want to be (improved institutional efficiency); 
what are the arrangements to make this happen (institutional choice) and finally how they could be 
implemented (institutional change). 
 
6.4.1 Determinant factors for the provision of institutional arrangements 
 
A critical factor for institutional change in the PSE is how to cope with the constant decrease 
over the years of O&M budget made available by the government, which after the dollarization of the 
economy in 2000, became particularly critical as it increased the price of several inputs required for 
the operation of the irrigation system. The solution to this problem is not new and has been broadly 
discussed in irrigation literature
8. It basically consists of procuring a more active participation of users 
in irrigation development in order to make the systems more sustainable. 
In this respect, the literature on WUAs is conclusive in confirming the advantages of such an 
approach to ensure a “good” management of the water resources and infrastructure
9. This confronts us 
with  two  crucial  questions  for  the  subsequent  discussion:  whether  revitalized  WUAs  could  be  a 
vehicle of change in the PSE and under what conditions these organizations could be viable. This is 
important given that there are no reasons to think that O&M budgets made available by the State will 
be increased or even available in the near future, and that the State will become all of a sudden an 
efficient provider of irrigation services. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the participation of users 
through private collectives (for which collective actions are required) is the more crucial factor to 
consider in the definition of the new institutional equilibrium. 
According to different authors
10, for irrigation systems to be productive and sustainable, water 
users must play a larger role in their governance, financing, and management. This view is based on 
several studies that have documented improvements in performance of government funded systems 
through the creation of WUAs, although the sustainability of this arrangement is often problematic, 
primarily due to problems of accountability. Even so, the advantages of a bottom-up approach for 
                                                 
8 See Vermillion (1999), Höynck (2003), Jones (1995), Merrey (1996), Ostrom (1992) 
9 For more details see Herrera, 2005. 
10 See mainly Ostrom (1992), Vermillion (1999) and Merrey (1996) organizing irrigation management are widely recognized in irrigation literature. Based on IWMI, SIC-
ICWC (2003), for example, WUAs that are established using a top-down approach are weak and have 
a high risk of failure, while WUAs that are based on a bottom-up consultative approach and work with 
ordinary grassroots level water users are robust organizations that generate benefits to their members. 
Hence, it seems that procuring a more active participation of users in the governance of irrigation 
is a sound institutional arrangement that has proved to be partially successful even in Ecuador if some 
conditions are met. These conditions are basically related to establishing better farmer’s backward-
linkages  with  input  supply  systems  (financing  included),  as  well  as  forward-linkages  with  output 
marketing systems. Note that these linkages are outside the boundaries of irrigation institutions, which 
implies that a broader view of institutional change is necessary. This implies that it is not enough to 
have  a  supportive  formal  institutional  environment  for  water  issues,  secure  water  rights,  local 
management capacity building, and an enabling process to facilitate management transfer, which has 
been the approach proposed by donors agencies and development organizations that promote TIM 
processes.  
This suggests that institutional alternatives to be successful in the context of PSE must deal with 
the entire complex of constraints facing PSE’ landholders and help them move to a substantially 
higher trajectory of productivity and income, from where they can absorb the additional cost and 
responsibility of managing the irrigation systems. In developing such institutional alternatives, rather 
than focusing only on direct transfer of irrigation management, we propose to design an institutional 
setting that simultaneously procures to enhance the wealth-creating potential of landholders irrigated 
farming  by  strengthening  market  access,  promoting  high-value  crops,  and  improving  systems  for 
providing extension and technical support to irrigators.  
In terms of the model of institutional change depicted in figure 4, we need arrangements that 
allow farmers to unlock the institutional setting by creating the conditions for private and/or political 
stakeholders to invest in institutional change as means of improving their cost-benefit ratios of doing 
so. Based on this model, there are several ways of unlocking the institutional equilibrium. Regarding 
improvements in the institutional structure brought about by private stakeholders, there are various 
options. They can for example select to invest in technology as long as they perceive that the benefits 
of doing so are higher than the costs. Another possibility is, of course, to invest in institutional change, 
which as has been demonstrated previously, may improve the cost-benefit ratio of private stakeholders 
as long as a redefinition of property rights allows them to participate in the O&M of the system. 
Furthermore, if arrangements that improve the linkages with input and output supply systems are also 
provided, it is likely that private stakeholders perceive the need of securing the provision of irrigation 
as this will then become a critical production factor, making more likely investments in institutional 
change to improve the provision of irrigation water. 
Summarizing, it is possible to conclude that the PSE requires arrangements for: improving the 
management of the irrigation system; improving the linkages with input supply systems; improving 
the linkages with output supply systems; and improving the linkages with political collectives through 
political stakeholders in order to induce institutional change.  
Regarding the necessary conditions to make WUAs be a viable vehicle of change in the PSE, we 
think  they  are  related  to:  agreement  on  the  path  of  development  wanted  for  the  PSE,  so  that 
speculation of land is avoided; incentives for farmers to undertake actions through private collectives 
as  well  as  arrangements  to  shield  from  the  problems  derived  from  collective  actions;  a  sound 






With these theoretical aspects in mind, and given the institutional equilibrium in place in the 
PSE, the aim of the previous sections was to answer the question of what institutional arrangements 
(institutional choices) could activate a process of institutional change to allow society to reach a new 
institutional  equilibrium.  In  this  respect,  it  is  stressed  the  central  role  of  collective  actions  for 
implementing the required changes, which is the overall superior arrangement landholders need to 
                                                 
11 A very detailed explanation of each institutional arrangement can be found in Herrera, 2005. agree  in  order  to  reach  a  superior  level  of  development.  Furthermore,  the  need  of  tackling 
simultaneously  other  related  topics,  which  were  found  to  be  crucial  for  securing  investments  in 
institutional change, was revealed. 
Note that the fundamental aspect to make this new institutional equilibrium functioning is the 
design and provision of new rules on payment, which can be said, is the real driver of change. This 
introduces incentives to landholders, and makes possible the sustenance of the institutional setting by 
financing WUAs. If landlords are obliged to pay a fixed amount of water rights because they have land 
in the area of influence of the canals, then this could reduce abandonment of agricultural land, enhance 
farming and thus also participation in irrigation and in other institutions. It would also be an incentive 
for making land market functioning more efficient. 
  Thus,  based  on  the  findings  of  these  last  sections  as  well  as  the  theoretical  sections  at  the 
beginning of this paper, it is possible to conclude that both theoretically and in the application arena, 
the proposed methodology for conducting institutional economic analysis is consistent and robust. As 
final  recommendation,  we  suggest  more  research  on  suitable  methodologies  for  undertaking 
institutional analysis of governance structures. This should consider the interdependencies of all the 
different institutional structures that affect the allocation of a particular resource. Concerning the four-
step methodology for institutional analysis proposed, although it seems to be very consistent both 
theoretically and empirically, further elaboration may be necessary, as well as further applications to 
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